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Political Activity of Russians:
Current Trends and Resources of Media Influence
IVAN V. RADIKOV, ALEXANDRA I. RADUSHINSKAYA, SVETLANA S. MOROZOVA &
VLADIMIR G. BELOUS
Saint-Petersburg State University, Russian Federation
Authors assume that in the post-Soviet time, political consciousness among the
Russians has significantly changed. Causes of this not only include general de-
politicization in the society, but also a modified nature of the media influence.
The research purpose is to search for reasons that cause booms and falls in the
interest of the Russians in politics. The methodological framework of the research
included the Verba-Pye model of engagement in politics, L ipset's conclusions
about citizens' engagement in political affairs; assumptions from the L ipset-
Rokkan model of political preferences of citizens; Scott's concept of imitation of
political activism, and Bryant's conclusions about specifics of media influence on
public opinion. The empirical basis of the research includes data from sociological
and marketing research made by Russian centers for the study of public opinion.
As a result of the research, its authors have established that country residents do
not mostly show high political engagement and civil activism.
Keywords: Political interest, political activity, political inaction, political imitation,
depressive society, media
Political interest and citizens’ political participation appear to be necessary attributes of
developed democracy. Interest in politics shapes citizens’ attitude to political participation,
as well as encourages its formation, functioning, and development. In this connection, the
phenomenon of taking part in the social and political life has long become a theoretical
research subject. For the past 60 years (from the mid-50s of the 20th century to the present
days), several trends in the interpretation of political participation have been formulated.
First and foremost political participation is analyzed: as political culture indicator (Almond
& Verba, 1963); from the viewpoint of the participatory democracy conception (Pateman,
1970; Barber, 1984). Also political participation is interpreted as a means of maintaining
the social system balance, providing the possibility for the broad layers of population to
influence politics, and implementing democracy (the structural functionalism supporters:
R. Merton (Merton, 1996), S. Lipset (Lipset, 1967)). Clearly, political participation is regarded
as the manifestation of rivalry and fight, the way of negative emotions channeling (conflict
theory followers (Darendorf, 2002)); as personal development condition and political
socialization element (Rozenstone & Hansen, 1993). The Theoroll’s approach is of a
considerable research interest. Theoroll proposed five criteria for political engagement:
participation in elections, political consumption, membership or active participation in
political institutions, protest activism, contact-associated activities (contacting public
servants) (Teorell, Torcal, & Montero, 2007: 334-357).
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Multidisciplinary research project ‘Processes Influencing Democratic Ownership
and Participation 2009-2012,’ held at the initiative of the European Union and focused on
studies of activism in politics and civic engagement in nine European countries, also
confirms relevance of the research subject. As a result of the research project, authors
developed a multi-level model for the process of civil and political engagement, referred to
in The Political and Civic Engagement and Participation: Towards an Integrative Perspective
edited by Barrett (Barrett & Brunton-Smith, 2014: 5-28). In Russia, the activity approach
(Goncharov, 1997; Selivanova, 2017; Radikov, 2015, 2016) is the dominating one in the
political participation analysis.
The above mentioned trends can serve now as the reliable methodological basis for
finding a specific component of the political participation phenomenon. However, each of
them allows analyzing solely one of the several structural peculiarities of the phenomenon.
The systematic approach is needed for the integral and comprehensive consideration of
this problem. Moreover, these trends let a researcher observe and explain deeds; political
activity (in its implicit and potential state) remains out of sight. The matter is that, in the
modern conditions, human activity, pushed out of the visual realm of politics, becomes an
object in the virtual space (the Internet) and remains the integral property of the human
being. Finally, not all provisions of these conceptions (theories) can be mechanically used
for the analysis of the Russian political reality.
One should admit that, in politics, there are no generally accepted and proven
theories of political participation which take into account the influence of the spiritual
components of transforming society on its citizens’ political activity; there is no thorough
scientific analysis devoted to the impact of intensifying social stratification, inequality,
and poverty.
In a review of the causes for falls and declines in activism of Russian citizens, we
proceed from results of Bryant’s research, who analysed theoretical structures of media
influence of the today’s type: socio-cognitive theory, ‘use-satisfaction’ theory, and cultivation
hypothesis (Bryant, 2002).
In our study, we proceed from the assumption that politics in Russia sometimes has
an imitative character: democratic institutions acquire decorative and fictive traits. These
institutions are often decried as pseudo-parliament, pseudo-election, pseudo-justice,
pseudo-free mass media, pseudo-publicity, and pseudo-parties.
The theoretical basis for considering this aspect is the conceptions of the correlation
between the imagined and the real (Berger & Luckmann, 1966); social imitation (Zinovyev,
2006; Toschenko, 2015; Shalyugina, 2011); simulation and simulacrum (Baudrillard 1981;
Deleuze, 1998). Referring to these conceptions, many Russian researchers often write about
imitating activity of the authority representatives. For instance, T. Shalyugina reflects
upon imitation of the party system and political rivalry (2011); S. Pshizova looks into the
issue of imitation in political practice (2004); A. Margulev analyses the essence of the
imitating state (2008); M. Leontiev gives a general characteristic of the Russian political
system as imitation of the generally accepted “civilized liberal standard” (2014).
Virtually all researchers of this problem begin with the fact that the imitation is
usually applied by the administrative bureaucracy in order to persuade the population of
positive changes that take place due to its initiative or under its guidance. In this work, we
assert that citizens themselves often imitate these or those social roles in their daily life.
They imitate political backing of certain political power, leader, and rather often—political
party membership.
The hypothesis of the study is the decline in political interest among the significant
part of the Russians, especially among the youth, is due to the depressive character of the
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contemporary Russian society, deepening and unprecedented social stratification,
persisting poverty, inequality, unfair national wealth distribution, and poor performance
of political media projects. In such conditions, the political activity is often of the imitating
character. The aim of the study is to discover the reasons behind the ever-changing interest
of the Russians in politics and political activity imitation. To reach this aim, the following
tasks are consecutively accomplished in this work:
(i) To reveal the influence of the country’s authoritarian legacy on the political activity.
(ii) To establish the place of politics in today’s values of the Russian people.
(iii) To uncover the reasons behind the correlation between the imitating activity and the
Russian tradition.
(iv) There is a review of the role of resources of media influence on development of
political activity.
Literature Review and Methodology
Lipset’s statement that “the participation of members belonging to any organisation or of
citizens as society members taking part in political affairs is neither necessary nor sufficient
condition for ordinary, unnoticeable people’s influence on politics of the mentioned
organisation or a country’s government” (Lipset, 2016: 215). Today the logic of his
argumentation is thought to be accepted for understanding the peculiarities of Russian
politics. On the one hand, the citizens demonstrating a low level of political activity can
have an impact on politics by the very ability to underpin (or refuse to do it) this or that
faction struggling for power. On the other hand, the citizens showing intense political
activity, attending various meetings, conventions and demonstrations, as well as
participating in elections, can hardly affect politics. Lipset also formulates an important
warning for the power. He writes: “If members of an organisation or citizens of a country do
not demonstrate any ‘political’ activity, then they evade the influence of the power that
controls them” (Lipset, 2016: 215). This thesis is believed to refer to non-democratic regimes.
The assumptions of Lipset-Rokkan’s classical “genetic” model, according to which
citizens’ political preferences are predetermined by the combination of the five conditions:
social status, income level, residence, education, and religion (Lipset, Rokkan, 1967).
Recognizing that today these conditions are still relevant, we should also note the fairness
of the assertion of P. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues that electoral choice is primarily
influenced by the voter’s solidarity with a particular social group rather than their
individual preferences (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1969: 148). Equally important is
the hypothesis of the “rational choice” theory followers who believe that the degree of
every person’s participation in politics depends on the potential profit from it.
Our analysis is also based on the dealing with participation (or non-involvement)
in various elections as a criterion for measuring the level of political activity, and the
citizens’ attitude to political institutions, leaders and parties–for measuring political
activity’s valuable and psychological level. Nietzsche’s postulate about human inclination
to pretend, “the habit to masquerade, conventionality, acting out in public and for yourself”
(Nietzsche, 2005) plays an important role in the methodology of the research. For
the purposes of our analysis we  consider political activity imitation as a specific protection
function in the conditions of political pressure, routine form of resistance, specific diversity
of “the weapon of the weak” (Scott, 1996).
We should also specify Bryant’s conclusions that support the fact that an external
environment, individual differences, psychological factors, and characteristics of social
groups directly affect perception and use of information.
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The authors’ methodology is influenced by “The Society of the Spectacle” by Guy-
Ernest Debord (1999) and the paradigm of game-ization by S. Kravchenko (2002). The
empirical base of the study is sociological and marketing research data from the Russian
centres for public opinion study (the Institute of Sociology of the RAS, All-Russia Public
Opinion Research Centre (VCIOM), Levada-Centre, the Public Opinion Foundation).
Results
Authoritarian Syndrome as Political Activity Brake
The level of the Russian citizens’ participation in politics is still conditioned by the hybrid
character of the Russian political system—the combination of democratic institutes’
elements and authoritarian methods of ruling. Today’s Russia is perceived by the West as
the state with rapidly developing authoritarian characteristics. As far back as 2012, the
British newspaper Economist Intelligence Unit, while ranking countries by their democracy
development level, put Russia on the 122nd place and classified its regime as authoritarian.
In 2016, confirming the tendency of escalating authoritarianism in Russia, the same
research gave the country the 134th place out of 167 states (the Democracy level, 2016).
Fifteen years after the collapse of the USSR, R. Pipes stated that “the Russians are afraid of
democracy. They do not believe that the state can be governed democratically” (Pipes,
2015: 71). Many Russian scientists who admit the dominance of nondemocratic methods
in the country’s political process (Dmitriev, 2011; Krasin, 2007: 260-261) agree with this
evaluation explaining the phenomenon by the influence of the authoritarian syndrome
(Dmitriev, 2011; Krasin, 2007). The authoritarian syndrome implies the irrational attitude
to power, non-critical evaluation of the political guidance, hierarchization of the social
and political space, paternalistic perception of the state, the search for an external enemy,
aggressiveness, the cult of power and dignity, aspiration to see the country as a superpower
(Grigorieva, 2014).
Here, we should stress that today’s authoritarian tendencies reveal themselves not
only in Russia. They also become noticeable in other countries that pave the way for
democracy. It is obvious that it will take decades to overcome the authoritarian legacy. In
these conditions, the majority of the Russian citizens do not show high civil or political
activity assuming that they are not in a position to affect processes not only within the
country, but also in their own city, region, house, yard, and at work. According to the data
published by “Levada-Centre” in November 2017, 60 per cent of respondents do not feel
any personal responsibility for what is going on in the country, and 68 per cent of them
consider that they are unable to influence political processes that take place in the country.
It is even more remarkable that 57 per cent of citizens assert that they are powerless to
influence on-going processes in their city (region) while 28 per cent (in their house and
yard), and 18 per cent (at work). Only 5 per cent of the Russians realize that have the power
to affect the country’s current state of affairs, and only 24 per cent of them feel a slight
degree of personal responsibility for what is happening in the country (ANO “Levada-
Centrå”, 2017). In addition, we should note that the majority of the respondents do not
express any regrets about it. Two thirds of the Russian citizens (65 per cent) assess the
situation in the country as good, i.e. they are quite satisfied with the policy conducted
(VCIOM, 2017).
The aforementioned sociological indicators mirror the depressive character of the
contemporary Russian society. It will not be an exaggeration to say that now-a-days the
society displays a lack of social optimism, energy and common beliefs about not only the
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collective, but also the individual future. The depressive tendency of this society is
characterised by the spiritual vacuum of the vast part of the population caused by shifts in
their lifestyle, the loss of moral values, vagueness, disappointment in the conducted policy,
tiredness of unfulfilled promises given by the authorities, deepening social stratification,
and worrisome expectations aroused by the escalating confrontation with the West. Such
a society cannot generate extraordinary thinkers, philosophers, writers who are able to
put forward great mobilizing ideas and benchmarks for the society development.
The social-environment betrays not only political apathy, but also the citizens’
tiredness of politics. The population lives in growing fear apprehending changes that are
associated with possible deterioration of the situation rather than with hopes for better.
That is why most of the Russian citizens endorse the established social order that is
perceived as stable and constant.
Is Politics No Longer a Priority in the Values of the Russian People?
Two and a half of the post-Soviet decades have significantly modified the Russian citizens’
political consciousness. Today, we can confidently say that most Russians do not treat
politics as a priority sphere any more. According to the data published by specialists of
ANO “Levada-Centre”, in 2015, only 7 per cent of the population demonstrated their active
interest in politics (interested very much), and 30 per cent – moderate one (rather interested).
In total, 60 per cent of respondents declared that they were not interested in politics:
“rather uninterested in politics” (38 per cent) and “uninterested at all” (22 per cent). A
small group of respondents (3 per cent) was uncertain about the answer (ANO “Levada-
Centre”, 2015).
Two years later, in 2017, opinion poll “Political Interest and Information Sources “
aimed at teenagers (aged 15–17) and performed by Russia’s Opinion Poll Foundation
showed that 64 per cent of respondents of this age group are not interested in politics (The
Public Opinion Foundation, 2017, May). Only the half of the young respondents (aged 17–
34) said that they were somewhat interested in politics (The Public Opinion Foundation,
2017, April).
This situation also prevails in the social sphere. There are serious obstacles on the
way towards the Russian citizens’ socialisation. According to sociological opinion polls,
80.3 per cent of the Russians are not members of any social organisations; 53.5 per cent of
the citizens have never taken part in any types of political life (Toshenko, 2016).
There are numerous explanations for such inaction of the Russian citizens. It should
be noted that in the modern information society mass participation as a criterion for
political activity, maturity, and development, is no longer as relevant as it was in the past.
Due to the cutting-edge means of communication, even small but active groups of citizens
can have a great impact on the life of the country, city, region, village, etc. Declining interest
in “big politics” is accompanied by the latent politicization of significant segments of
various subcultures and informal movements. In 2014, the Institute of Sociology of the RAS
carried out a study devoted to the Russian middle class. It revealed that “non-systematic
opposition, due to a great number of famous writers, musicians, journalists and actors
among its members, tries to compensate the drop in the street protests by organizing
public meetings, debates, lectures and concerts, thereby maintaining the interest in the
political agenda that is crucial for them, as well as in the general opposition activity”
(Gorshkov & Tihonova, 2016: 304). The reasons behind the low level of the Russians’
political participation are the following:
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(i) The overwhelming majority of the Russians do not consider either social or political
participation as “social lifts”, opportunities for personal promotion
(Gorshkov&Tihonova, 2016).
(ii) Some citizens lack values at the level of their self-understanding as full-fledged and
committed members of an existing society. Many citizens exhibit aloofness not only
from politics, but also from society.
(iii) Aartificially created and unfavourable for politics is the culture of provocations, or
trolling that is widespread in the net communication. The point is that online forums
and social networks give false, lop-sided and subjective information, create not only
uncompromising attitude to many important social and political issues, but also
cynic perception of political power. In this context, the statement that politics is “a
dirty affair” connected with lie and violation is deeply rooted in the public
consciousness.
(iv) The effect of the ‘reached stability’ in politics. As a rule, such position is typical of the
authority representatives. In 2013, S. Zheleznyak, the vice-speaker of the State Duma,
Deputy Secretary of the Council General “United Russia”, talked about declining
political interest as a positive tendency proving that the Russians had started “living
better”. He declared that people “have started thinking more about the daily routine.
Now the Russians are more focused on children, parents, work, education and
healthcare rather than politics. Our citizens are engrossed in taking care of their
families and well-being, they plan for the future and vacation”. And then: “The public
authority system and politics have become more clear, transparent and accountable
to the society. People assessed it positively, switching to other tasks. So, in these
conditions, a decrease in political interest is a logical and positive process”
(Zheleznyak, 2013). D. Peskov, the press secretary of Russia’s President, called the
Russians’ political interest decline as a really natural and cyclic process (The Kremlin
States, 2017).
(v) Low level of political education and culture of the Russian people. Many Russian
citizens limit politics to what the power representatives are engaged in (called as
“they”). Since, in their opinion, this policy vector does not touch their own interests,
the predominant attitude to it lies in irritation. They see politics as a means of its
senseless corruption, enrichment of the people in power who service their own
interests.
(vi) Excessive consumption—typical of new Russian society cultivating the values of
individualism and egoism that affect mostly the youth (Ilyin, 2014). It is also deep
concentration on privacy and interpreting freedom only as freedom of individual
choice.
(vii) Russian citizens’ poverty level. As they mainly focus on the problems of physical
survival, it leaves them no time and strength to participate in political activity. Thus,
they are not interested in politics, do not demand political shifts in the country and
do not believe in the possibility of real improvement in their social position.
(viii) A qualitatively new structure and content of the media: marginalization of political
media structures, the modified role of ‘media influence’. For today’s Russian authorities,
independent decision-making is crucial therefore, attempts of pressure made by the
media or public opinion are generally taken hard. The role of ‘media influence’ mainly
comes down to transmission of a certain set of messages that the authorities consider
necessary to bring to the notice of the society or specific groups. Online media are
only focused on priorities of one of the parties, using various spin techniques. There
is a growing trend towards taking the information about political processes from
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various sources of information, from satellite channels to the Internet. In terms of
their almost unlimited freedom, they distribute the most diverse, often not exact, and
sometimes deliberately false information. An avalanche-like flow of information
overlaps rather poor political awareness and culture of the population. This leads to
negative judgements of an entire political process.
Alongside with that declining political interest has one more dimension. The very
fact of distrust to politicians and power does not mean that citizens completely refrain
from political participation of any form. Many of them still take part in all sorts of elections,
meet with political leaders, join political parties and attend party conventions. Besides,
avast majority of citizens join the ruling party and imitate political activity by inertia,
habit or just in case (as it was long time ago in the Soviet Union Communist Party). Some of
them do it “playing” in order to provoke even more doubt among the Russian people. For
instance, K. Sobchak, when talking about her “presidential ambitions”, called her
hypothetical presidency as “mock” or “top-level art project” (Fyodorova, 2017). It seems
that the camouflaged essence of such imitated political activity is to undermine public
trust in the institution of election even more. We need to point out that huge masses of the
poor in Russia with their feelings of social discontent, if guided intentionally, can be
converted into a force that is very dangerous to political power.
The degree of political, especially electoral activity in Russia, its selective character
is explained by the established authority structure. In other words, political and civil
activity of the Russian citizens is proportional to the significance of a certain political
institution (civil society institution) in politics (the public life). The statistical data
concerning voters’ turnout in the post-Soviet time proves this logic. During this period,
citizens showed the peak of activity during the presidential elections. People regard the
President as the cure for all their life problems. Despite a certain decrease, this turnout is
still heavy: 69.81 per cent in 1996, 68.84 per cent in 2000, 64.38 per cent in 2004, 69.6 per
cent in 2008, and 65.3 per cent in 2012. The turnout in the State Duma election is much
poorer, together with a faster drop: 64.76 per cent in 1995, 61.85 per cent in 1999, 55.67
per cent in 2003, 63.78 per cent in 2007, 60.1 per cent in 2011, and 47.88 per cent in 2016.
Citizens demonstrate even less interest in the election of the heads of the Federation’s
subjects. For example, in 2017 the minimum turnout was recorded in Tomsk oblast (25.77
per cent), Novgorod oblast (28.35 per cent), the Republic of Karelia (29.35 per cent), and
the Udmurt Republic (34.55 per cent). The exception was the Republic of Mordovia, where
the turnout reached 81.96 per cent.
Finally, citizens demonstrate the least interest in municipal elections. The difficulty
in establishing the turnout dynamics is due to the fact that the information about the
election outcome has become available on the website of the Central Election Commission
only since 2009. In this connection, we should note the most alarming example. In 2017,
the turnout during the election to the Councils of Deputies of Municipal Formations of the
City of Moscow was only 14.82 per cent (source: RF Central Election Commission).
As citizens’ political activity is a sign of legitimacy, the authorities have to be
undoubtedly interested in intensifying this activity. It is unacceptable today to resort to
administrative methods for resolving this problem. There is an urgent need for real political
reforms that will implement the power-sharing principle both vertically and horizontally.
Some changes have occurred recently. Regional and local authorities have started tackling
more local problems and making improvements in cities and settlements. The practice of
holding dialogues between the active part of the population and municipalities has become
more widespread.
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Political Activity Imitation: Tradition of Cynicism, Fear, and Obedience
The less positive changes happen in socio-economic life and politics, the usefulness
of which could be realised by the majority of citizens, the more frequently the red tape
applies the imitation practice in order to convince the population otherwise. The imitation
is a printed in the mind and “imposed” construct of the symbolic social reality and a set of
social technologies of “imposing influence” and “emotional inspiration”, manipulation
practices, functioning in the historical and current social reality and designated to model
visibility and “plausibility” of originality (Shalyugina, 2011).
Zinovyev defined imitativeness as a property of not only the past, but also of the
new social organisation of Russia characterising its essence as a whole and each
component in particular. He wrote: “The imitation is a conscious action of people to create
objects-imitations that, according to the initial idea, should be perceived as objects-
originals… One can speak about the degree of imitativeness of the whole union, its separate
events, actions of authorities and parties, etc.” (Zinovyev, 2006: 429). According to his
opinion, “the Russians who lived a certain part of their conscious life in the Soviet period,
must remember the great role that was played by showing-off, the creation of a facade of
success, all kinds of solemn performances designed to demonstrate unity, loyalty, readiness,
etc., imaginary phenomena of the Soviet life style” (Zinovyev, 2006: 430). Today’s Russian
citizens remember the time of comprehensive, universal imitation established by the end
of Leonid Brezhnev’s epoch. Imitation, as not simply copying or reproduction, but as a fake
and a conscious action close to pretense or simulation, to the creation of the false belief
about anything, existed in all processes of social and political life of the Soviet society.
There is a rather popular statement in the modern literature, which explains the
imitating character of political activity in Russia. It is about the specific anthropology of
a “Soviet person”, “adjusted to the repressive state and learnt to live in it at the expense of
a decrease in demands, immoralism (ethical particularism) and opportunism, the skills of
demonstrative loyalty to the authorities” (“Political cynicism”, 2015: 140). This behaviour
is often called as political cynicism. According to Gudkov, “the up-to-date Russian cynicism
is generated primarily by unsuccessful attempts of democratic modifications of society
and the state, the abortion character of Russia’s modernisation, … mass disappointment
in the reforms and converting hopes (illusions) into the aggression against those who were
previously associated with opportunities and their implementation, namely democrats,
liberals, and politicians” (“Political cynicism”, 2015: 141).
At the same time, we should pay attention to the fact that the masses (population,
citizens) are not only passive objects of imitation practices. Even if there is no positive
motivation to the performed activity, imitation can become the specific way for people to
build into the changing reality and demands of the authorities. Such actions are based on
two instincts that are built-in the human being: self-preservation instinct and the instinct
to follow the crowd, act as the majority and be a part of society (herd behavior).
Gellner explains the nature of the support for the existing social order. In “Liberty
Conditions, the Civil Society and its Historical Competitors”, he underlines two important
moments that characterise people’s attitude to society. Firstly, the idea about justice of the
social structure that is predominant among them and, secondly, credulity and insufficient
criticism. The author writes: “There are people and even groups treating society rather
cynically. But still, this is a rather rare case. People are more often convinced that the
existing order is generally fair.” To think differently, to suppose that you are trapped in the
unfair public establishment, is merely inconvenient. People will treat themselves as sinners
rather than condemn the public order in which they live. The feeling of personal guilt is
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preferable to hatred for the universal order… It is much easier for an average person to
take beliefs for granted, if other community members share them: he or she pretends to be
driven by these convictions not accentuating them and not showing any particular doubts,
so they expect the same from others. It is a convenient position, which satisfies most of
people… The striking ease with which, under the shift in balance of power, whole peoples
change their convictions indicates that these creeds are not so deep. The ease with which
even the most ridiculous regimes and ideologies keep their power, proves credulity of
people or, at least, their insufficient criticism” (Gellner, 1995: 147).
As for the reasons that make people hide the true causes of political activity, we also
need to point out the peculiarities of the Russian political culture containing elements of
social fear of possible losses due to political alterations. Dealing with fear as one of the
strongest emotions emerging in case of the threat to a person’s life, his or her ideals, principles
and values, we should emphasize that this feeling may arise both in the real conditions and
in imaginary, illusionary and false dangers that are perceived as the real ones.
Reviewing P. Boucheron and C. Robin’s book “The Art of Fear”, in which the authors
regard the usage of fear in politics, C. Kikuchi remarks: “Fear serves as a justification for
the ruling method, a political program that is designed irrespectively of citizens’ feelings.
Their fear can easily grow into readiness to obey the rules.” To fear means to be ready to
obey. She deduces that the very fear becomes a convenient means in politics that demands
implicit faith (Kikuchi, 2016).
According to sociological studies, a rather high percentage of the Russian
respondents are afraid of toughening the political regime and the return of mass repressions
(“The Russians revealed”, 2017). In this context, the state patronage ingrained in the memory
of the elderly generation of the Russians as a guarantee of a living wage, as a possibility to
live a hand-to-mouth existence but without making great efforts at work and, in some
cases, simply imitating the useful activity, is still attractive in Russia.
There is one more circumstance which we must take into account while finding out
the reasons for political activity imitation. This refers to radical individualization that,
according to Z. Bauman, characterises the society of the late 20th century. The author
distinguishes the three main signs: loss of control over the majority of crucial social
processes; increasing vagueness and progressing vulnerability of the personality in front
of uncontrollable changes; human aspiration to stop pursuing promising objectives in
favor of immediate results (Bauman, 2005: 9, 56, 96, 107, 146, 152, 166, 194). These signs
are thought to be typical of the modern Russian society and lead to both social and private
life disintegration.
Conclusion
The conducted research has proved the formulated hypothesis. Two and a half decades of
the post-Soviet period changed the political consciousness of the Russian citizens: today
there is every reason to assert that the political sphere of life is no longer a priority in the
values of most Russians. Causes do not only include general de-politicization in the society,
but also the modified role of ‘the media influence.’ Their interest in politics has a cyclical
character. Nevertheless, its decrease, compared to the early 1990s, cannot be regarded as
an absolutely natural and objective process. It is fallacious to attribute the decline in the
activity, as some authorities do, to satisfaction of the population with their life, as well as
to the shift from politics to more substantial problems of healthcare, work, family, and
leisure time. The mobilizing method of increasing activeness of the Russians, which has
been applying for a few decades, becomes increasingly ineffective. Moreover, intensifying
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political pessimism and gloomy worldview are becoming characteristic features of the
Russian society. There is alarming statistics, published by the Institute of Sociology of the
Russian Academy of Sciences (ISRAS) in December 2017, which says that nearly half of the
Russians do not believe in their country’s future and are confident that the presidential
elections will change nothing. Only 26 per cent of the citizens (in spring, it was 31 per cent)
believe that they will improve their wealth in the nearest future (Filina, 2017: 12).
The decline in interest in politics among a significant part of the Russians, and young
people in particular, reflects a depressive nature of the modern society, hardly expressing
social optimism, social energy, and inspiring views on both the collective and individual
future. Its depressive nature is characterized by a spiritual inner vacuum caused by
alterations in their life style, loss of moral compass, uncertainty, disappointment with
current policy, tiredness of broken promises of the government, increasing social
stratification, and apprehensive expectations of a growing confrontation with the West.
The necessity to boost political and civic activity of the Russians under new challenges is
linked to the problem of government control, rationalization of internal and external
policies, and social unity of the government. A growth of voluntary movement of various
types seems quite hopeful in this connection.
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